ON, M Attorneys for Respondent-in-Intervention, CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
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M Attorneys for Respondent-in-Intervention, CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION
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E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
UNTY OF ALAMEDA
) Case No. RG15769302)
) INDUSTRY GROUPS' REQUEST FOR) JUDICIAL NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT) OF COURT HEARING IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
)))) Date: July 2, 2015
) Time: 9:00 a.m.
) Dept.: 17) Judge: Hon. George C. Hernandez, Jr.
)) Action Filed: May 7, 2015) Trial Date: None set)
)))
))
)

706043678v1

1	Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 450 et seq., Respondents-in-Intervention
2	Western States Petroleum Association, California Independent Petroleum Association and
3	Independent Oil Producers Agency (collectively, "Industry Groups") respectfully request
4	that this Court take judicial note of the transcript of proceedings from the June 15, 2015
5	hearing on motions to intervene before this Court, attached as Exhibit 1 to this request. The
6	Evidence Code mandates judicial notice of matters that comport with the requirements of
7	section 452, provided that the requesting party gives adequate notice to adverse parties and
8	includes sufficient information to enable the Court to take judicial notice. Evid. Code,
9	§ 453. Section 452(d) provides that "[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court
10	of record of the United States or of any state of the United States" may be judicially
11	noticed. Exhibit 1, a transcript of a hearing before this Court, falls within the category of
12	court records appropriate for judicial notice.
13	
14	Dated: June 19, 2015.
15	PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
16	MARGARET ROSEGAY NORMAN F. CARLIN
17	BLAINE I. GREEN MARLEY DEGNER
18	By What was
19	Blaine I. Green Attorneys for Respondent-in-Intervention,
20	WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION, et al.
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- 1 -

EXHIBIT 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE C. HERNANDEZ, JUDGE DEPARTMENT 17

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY, and SIERRA CLUB,

non-profit corporations,

Petitioners,

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CONSERVATION, DIVISION OF

OIL, GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL

RESOURCES, and DOES 1 through)

20, inclusive,

Respondents.

)

AERA ENERGY LLC, BERRY
PETROLEUM COMPANY, LLC,
CALIFORNIA RESOURCES
CORPORATION, CHEVRON U.S.A.,
INC., FREEPORT-MCMORAN OIL
& GAS, LLC, LINN ENERGY
HOLDINGS, LLC, and
MACPHERSON OIL COMPANY,

Respondents in Intervention.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
JUNE 15, 2015

REPORTED BY: KATHRYN LLOYD, CSR NO. 5955

JOB NO: 575153

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      DIVISION OF OIL, GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES,
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4:55 P.M.
 1
      JUNE 15, 2015
 2
                            PROCEEDINGS
 3
                THE COURT:
                            This is the Center for
 4
      Biological Diversity versus Cal Department of Oil,
 5
      Gas and the like.
 6
                And who do we have here today, starting
 7
      with the Plaintiffs?
                MR. ROSTOV: William Rostov on behalf of
 8
 9
      the plaintiffs.
10
                MR. KRETZMANN: Hollin Kretzmann for the
11
      plaintiffs.
12
                MS. PARDEE: Vera Pardee for the
13
      plaintiffs.
14
                MR. DINTZER: Good afternoon, your Honor.
15
      Jeffrey Dintzer on behalf of Aera Energy, Berry
16
      Petroleum, California Resources Corporation, Chevron,
17
      Freeport McMoran, Linn Energy Holdings, and
1.8
      MacPherson Oil.
19
                MR. WICKERSHAM: Good afternoon, your
2.0
              Matt Wickersham on behalf of Aera Energy,
      Berry Petroleum, California Resources Corporation,
21
22
      Chevron USA, Freeport McMoran, Linn Energy, and
23
      MacPherson Oil.
24
                MR. GREEN: Good afternoon, your Honor.
25
      Blaine Green for Pillsbury on behalf of Western
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1 States Petroleum Association as well as California 2 Independent Petroleum Association and Independent Oil 3 Producers Agency Industry. 4 Good afternoon, your Honor. MR. YEH: 5 Yeh from Manatt, Phelps and Phillips on behalf of 6 California Independent Petroleum Association. 7 THE COURT: Welcome, counselors. Please be 8 seated. 9 These are motions for intervention. 10 went through these matters and issued a Parties to 11 Appear. 12 And I read through the statements why the 13 proposed intervenors hoped to participate, both of 14 them. 15 I read also the response by the 16 petitioners, plaintiffs, why not. 17 And I'm going to then permit the moving 18 party to explain why the court should permit 19 intervention, and I'm going to permit the responding, 20 in this case, the Petitioner, to say why not. 21 since the intervenors have the burden, they will have 22 the last word. 23 So who is to speak on behalf of the 24 intervenors? 25 MR. WICKERSHAM: Your Honor, I would to

speak first.

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead.

MR. WICKERSHAM: I believe our position is pretty clear in the papers, so I'm trying to be brief, and then I'll be happy to answer any question that you have.

We believe that mandatory intervention and permissive intervention, both currently evident here.

Our clients are the energy companies, operate the vast majority of the wells, and hold the permits that are currently being challenged by the petitioner in this action. They are seeking to shut down thousands of wells that our clients are currently operating today.

Under the test for mandatory intervention, the first point is that you must make a timely motion. I don't think there is any real argument that our motion has not been timely.

Also must have a significantly protectable interest. And this is according to the test that is set forth in the Arakaki case that's cited in our briefs.

I believe here, our interest is very clear. Our clients currently hold permits that give them the right to inject waste water and/or produce water into

certain wells.

2.2

2.4

Petitioners have made the argument in their briefs that our interest is not protectable because they argue that it's illegal.

First, we are contesting that it is illegal, but there's no need for the court to go into any type of that determination now with this motion.

The cases they cite all concern merit determinations or issues where the court has made actual determinations and has determined what type of relief should be required.

None of them have involved intervention. None of them involve circumstances here where we are simply asking for the opportunity to be heard on the question of whether or not it is illegal and where the line should be drawn between what is a legal injection firm and what is not.

I think the Hodge case, where we cite Hodge versus Kirkpatrick Development, is illustrative on that point because it mentions in there that pre-determination does not need to be made by the court as to what types of claims or defenses are available to the proposed intervenor.

It's sufficient that their interest may be impeded or impaired as a result of this action. And

here it's clear that our interests would definitely be substantially impeded if the petitioner would get the relief that they are seeking for in their motion for preliminary injunction and in their petition for writ of mandate, they are asking this court to order DOGGR to prohibit injection activity as currently permitted by DOGGR for our clients to operate to inject into wells.

This type of order would be a direct impairment on their interest. Petitioners try to draw a distinction between invoking a permit versus the cessation of activities.

I think that the distinction -- it's not really a difference for purposes of the case law in terms of the liberal standard that must be applied to these cases.

You cannot rely on these types of formulaic distinctions between both your permit versus stopping activities. It's clear that there's going to be an impediment to our operations, and it's going to be a substantial impediment to our clients' interests.

And finally the last issue is whether or not DOGGR would adequately represent our interests.

And it's clear that in the case law that DOGGR is not an adequate representative.

In this case, People versus ex rel.

Rominger is very useful for this purpose because it has a very similar factual setting, where in this case the State of California tried to sue the county to invalidate some ordinances.

2.2

The Sierra Club, interestingly enough, moved to intervene in that case. The court allowed intervention, held that their interests were protected and that the county in this case is not an adequate representative, because the county is only interested in preserving its jurisdiction, it does not have the same interest as our client, or the Sierra Club in that case, in the underlying activity that is at stake by that ordinance, or in this case, the emergency regulations.

DOGGR only has an interest in determining its jurisdiction and in preserving its ability to enact these types of regulations.

Our clients have an interest in maintaining the operations that they have invested billions of dollars in building in this state, and which could be substantially interfered with by petitioner's case.

So if you have any questions, please ask.

THE COURT: Thank you, counselor. I'm

going to have both intervenors, and then I'll allow

you to respond.

Go ahead, counselor.

MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor, for this opportunity. I am here to present on behalf of the industry groups. I will keep my points relatively brief. It's many of the same points you have already heard from the energy companies.

I do want to emphasize just a few things. One is that when the court is considering an intervention motion, it is a practical inquiry that the court is to conduct. And that's actually built right into the statute of CCP387. 387(b), the mandatory intervention section speaks directly to that. It says that:

"If the person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property to transaction which is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by the existing parties, the court shall permit that person to intervene."

For mandatory intervention, it is a practical inquiry, as a practical matter here, it is

the oil producers and operators of these injection wells of whose operations would be impacted by the preliminary injunction that the plaintiff in this case seeks.

2.2

It is not DOGGR. DOGGR doesn't own the wells, doesn't operate the wells.

The plaintiffs are seeking an order, cessation orders from DOGGR, that would then force the industry groups and the energy companies to stop operating.

As a practical matter, that's a huge impairment, and for that reason, mandatory intervention is warranted.

Finally, I want to speak briefly to the adequacy of representation issues because I think that's probably the biggest argument, is the argument that the plaintiffs spent the most time making in their opposition.

With regard to adequacy of representation, the plaintiffs ignore many of the parts of their own complaint and their motion for preliminary injunction, which on their face showed that the interests of oil producers and the oil industry really are different from DOGGR's interests.

Notably, petitioners in their complaint and

their motion for preliminary injunction, concede that DOGGR has issued cessation orders and has obtained the cessation of 23 wells, 23 of these injection wells.

Now, that shows that those cessation orders had occurred independent of the emergency rulemaking that the plaintiffs are challenging.

This emergency rulemaking, plaintiffs characterize it as authorizing the continuance of the injection activities while certain deadlines occur.

In fact, as you read the emergency rulemaking carefully, what the regulations do is they set the deadline by which operations must cease.

It's actually a shut in order or shut down order by certain deadlines, date certain, unless the aquifers have been exempted by those dates.

So it's not a continuing authorization, it's a shut in schedule.

Now, DOGGR continues to have the ability. And in fact, this is an argument that the plaintiffs make in their complaint, in their motion to support preliminary injunction, that DOGGR continues to have the ability to order shut in prior to those deadlines.

Again, this shows that DOGGR's interests

are different and potentially adverse to the oil producers' interests.

We have made a couple of further responses in terms of the adversity or potential adversity in the way DOGGR doesn't represent industry group interests. And I'll reply. I won't belabor the points here, but we'll be happy to respond to the questions the court has and the arguments that may come up with that.

THE COURT: Very well.

Response?

1.0

MR. KRETZMANN: Good afternoon, your Honor. This case is about the ongoing and illegal injection that's occurring throughout the state and continues every day to contaminate our precious groundwater resources with benzene and other chemicals.

Now, each day that we wait, more and more irreversible contamination is occurring. So I want to emphasize for the court before we get into the reasons to deny the intervention, that the relief requested is very urgent and is a matter of dire public in need.

I also want to highlight that this case is very straightforward. The illegality of injections in this case has been acknowledged and admitted by

every relevant agency.

2.1

The only question is -- the fundamental question is: Given the admitted and widespread illegality of these injections, what is DOGGR's responsibility?

Do they have to act now to protect our groundwater resources from the public or do they have to act two years from now to cater to the oil industry's needs.

DOGGR has chosen the latter. And promulgating these emergency regulations, they have offered a gift to the oil industry, two-year free pass wherein which they do not need to comply with the Safe Drinking Water Act.

Your Honor, that decision by DOGGR is inexcusable, and that is why petitioners are before you challenging that decision by the agency.

DOGGR has demonstrated throughout this process that it is determined to fight tooth and nail for the oil industry's interests. And that's yet another reason to deny intervention.

As you have heard, the oil industry here is asserting that they have a right to intervene in the case.

And in order to be admitted to the case,

1 your Honor, they have to meet the statutory 2 obligations under mandatory or permissive 3 intervention, and they simply haven't met their 4 burden. 5 So under mandatory intervention, they first 6 need to show that they have a legally protectable 7 interest. 8 Now, they simply haven't shown that in this 9 case because we are only talking about those 1.0 injections that every relevant agency has admitted 11 are illegal in nature. They do not comply to the 12 Safe Drinking Water Act. 13 And let's walk through that. So three 14 simple points. 15 The Safe Drinking Water Act 16 prohibits the illegal injection into underground 17 sources of drinking water. 18 THE COURT: Has there been a determination 19 it's illegal? 20 MR. KRETZMANN: I'm sorry. 21 THE COURT: Has there been determination, 22 the judicial determination, that in fact the behavior 23 is illegal? 24 MR. KRETZMANN: DOGGR has admitted that 25 each of these cases --

1 THE COURT: You didn't answer my question. 2 I understand what you said. I understood 3 your papers. I understand your position. But I 4 asked this different question which is: 5 Has there been a legal determination either 6 by by the Federal Court or by the administrative 7 agency that, indeed, that what is occurring is 8 illegal? 9 That is not before this MR. KRETZMANN: 1.0 court, your Honor. 11 We can't go aguifer by aguifer and examine 12 whether it's qualified for an exemption --13 THE COURT: So the answer is no. 14 MR. KRETZMANN: Again, this case cannot 15 determine whether or not these aguifers qualify for 16 an exemption. 17 THE COURT: I understand. Now, you see, 1.8 you started off in your argument -- and you 19 essentially said, We are going to start with the 20 position for purposes of determining that, in fact, 21 the defendants do not -- the intervenors don't have 22 an opportunity to participate. 23 We start with a statement, everybody feels 24 it's illegal. And I asked a simple question of 25 whether or not there has been a judicial

1 determination of any judicial body that, in fact, it 2 is illegal, other than the concessions or the 3 admissions or the other statements made. 4 Has there be been a determination? Because that's the start of your argument, is that it's 5 6 illegal; and therefore if it's illegal, then they 7 don't have a right to participate or have a 8 proprietary interest in something that's illegal. 9 So I needed to know that first part. 10 So has anybody made that determination? 11 MR. KRETZMANN: It's per se illegal under 12 the Safe Drinking Water Act to inject into a 13 non-exempt aquifer. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So the answer is no. No 15 judicial branch, no administrative order has 1.6 determined right now that the behavior is illegal. 17 MR. KRETZMANN: It has been acknowledged by 18 every agency that has looked at this matter, your 19 Honor. 20 THE COURT: You don't have to answer my 21 question. You have answered my question. 2.2 Go ahead. You may continue. 23 MR. KRETZMANN: The illegality of this 2.4 aquifer is beyond question. Even if we wanted to 25 come to that decision, we wouldn't be able to because

1 the facts aren't in front of us. 2 DOGGR has admitted that it's still 3 gathering information about what to do with these 4 aquifers. 5 Now, in light of that, this case isn't about is it legal or illegal. This case is, given 6 7 that no determination has been made, what should we 8 be doing in the meantime? Should we be allowing 9 contamination to occur when there are no exemptions 10 in place? THE COURT: In the sentence you just said, 11 12 "no legal determination has been made," is that no 13 determination has been made that it's illegal? 14 MR. KRETZMANN: The courts have not looked 15 at it yet because they don't have the information 16 that's required --17 That was the answer to my first THE COURT: 18 question. And that helps. I just wanted to make 19 sure because that's what I believe occurred. 20 I believe that the behaviors, as you 21 indicated in your papers occurred. 22 I believe that, in fact, there was a 23 concession and admission or something on the part of 24 the agency. 25 I believe that as a result of that

acknowledgment, that 23 wells were stopped, or there is some sort of intervention.

And I believe from your statement that there are thousands yet to be resolved.

1.7

So if you are telling me -- and I thought that that was part of your argument -- that the intervenors do not have a right because, in fact, if the whole behavior is illegal, therefore, they wouldn't have a right to something that's illegal, then I needed to know first whether or not there had been a judicial determination of illegality, and then that would take me to one fact, if that has yet to occur, which I understand you didn't have knowledge, then that takes me down a different path.

MR. KRETZMANN: Right. It's impossible to make that call from a court's perspective because no one has bothered to go through the exemption process. And there is a whole lengthy exemption process where you have to get DOGGR's approval, the State Water Board's concurrence, written approval from EPA, the Federal EPA. And none of that has occurred here. So in that vacuum, where there's no evidence that the exemption exists, we believe that it is per se relief.

THE COURT: You can have that belief.

You may continue.

MR. KRETZMANN: So as I was

MR. KRETZMANN: So as I was pointing out, the Safe Drinking Water Act prohibits injection into an underground source of drinking water. That's plain and simple.

Secondly, the only way around that exemption is for an express and written approval for an exemption from the EPA.

And thirdly, that approval does not exist in any of these cases that we are talking about today. Again, we are just limiting our case to those specific injections.

And the illegality, as I mentioned, has been acknowledged by all the agencies involved in this case.

So DOGGR and the water board admitted in February that the division acknowledges that in the past it has approved underground injection projects and zoned to its aquifers lacking exemptions.

The DOGGR and Water Board later said in May, they sent a list of wells injecting into non-exempt, non-hydrocarbon bearing aquifers.

The State Water Board confirmed in March that "We believe any injection --"

THE COURT: I don't want to stop you,

1 but -- in fact, I do. I understand that part. MR. KRETZMANN: I don't want to belabor 2 3 that point. I just want to point out that every agency involved here is in agreement. 4 5 THE COURT: You understand that there is a 6 difference between evidence and the final 7 determination by a judge based upon the evidence 8 that, in fact, there is breach. 9 So you can say "I had a gun. I shot 10 someone, and as a result he died." But that isn't 11 murder until there is a determination that that either could be consistent with self defense. 12 13 could be consistent with all sorts of other things that would otherwise show that that behavior wasn't 14 15 criminal or against the law. So just because someone admitted -- and I 16 read what you said earlier -- of all those behaviors, 17 1.8 that doesn't lead to the final conclusion that, in 19 fact, it was illegal. It is your interpretation that 20 it was indeed illegal and that is the only way one 21 could fight it. But it's that last determination that the 22 23 court would have to determine whether that exists in 24 order to determine whether or not they had a right. 25 MR. KRETZMANN: I'll just add that we don't

1 have to reach that final determination on the 2 aguifers in order to resolve this case. 3 This case is about DOGGR's refusal to follow the law and the validity of those emergency 4 5 regulations. 6 THE COURT: You may or may not know that 7 this court sits and does Sequa and Water matters on a 8 regular basis and deals with the State Resources 9 Board and other environmental EPA matters on a more 10 or less regular basis. So I have an understanding of 11 how all of this works. I just have to see how this 12 fits. 13 MR. KRETZMANN: And so the oil industry has 14 not made a showing that it has met its first 15 requirement here to show that they have a legally 16 protectable interest. We are only talking about 17 illegal injection here. 18 THE COURT: And that's because it's 19 illegal? 20 MR. KRETZMANN: And we have cited the cases 21 that say that if you do not have the right to the 22 legal injection for protectable interest in illegal 23 activity. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Once is the charm to say 25 that. Okay.

2.0

MR. KRETZMANN: They quibble with our case law that says -- that did not have to do with intervention. But your Honor, the other cases that we do cite on intervention do talk about this requirement for a legally protectable interest that's our copy, and the oil industry, and other cases cite that as well.

This goes to the second requirement of mandatory intervention, your Honor, which is that their interests would have to be impaired or impeded. Again, they do not have an interest to begin with, that could not be --

THE COURT: What if they did impede?

MR. KRETZMANN: If they did, then that's one requirement out of the four for mandatory intervention.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KRETZMANN: The third requirement for mandatory intervention is that they have to overcome the presumption of adequate representation. And here, your Honor, there is no clear case of adequate representation between the agency and the industry than DOGGR.

The whole reason we are here is because DOGGR has put the interests, the private interests of

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1
      the oil industry above those of the public.
 2
                THE COURT:
                            That's your conclusion.
 3
                MR. KRETZMANN:
                                That's straight from DOGGR,
 4
      vour Honor.
                   Their whole reason for promulgating
 5
      these regulations, their main justification reads as
 6
      follows:
 7
                Regulated industry operators develop
 8
      long-range business plans with substantial capital
 9
      investments based around the operation of injection
1.0
      wells.
              Codification of the compliance schedule will
11
      provide the level of certainty operators need to
12
      revise their business plans accordingly.
13
                And it goes on to mention --
14
                THE COURT: This is the governmental agency
15
      explaining why they created the orders that they did?
16
                MR. KRETZMANN:
                                 That's correct.
17
                THE COURT:
                            Okav.
1.8
                MR. KRETZMANN: And then not only in the
19
      explanation of why they created regulations, but also
20
      in their opposition to our preliminary injunction
21
      they did make clear that the reason they are opposing
2.2
      our lawsuit is to protect the interests of the oil
23
      companies.
24
                They cite to the industry's investments,
25
      the capital investments, they need to protect those.
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1 They cite to their own statutory duty to 2 encourage the wise development of oil and gas 3 resources. 4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. KRETZMANN: So it's clear, your Honor, 6 that this is a guintessential case where the 7 industry's interests are represented by DOGGR. 8 The very private interest that they alleged 9 will not be represented --10 THE COURT: Do you have any other cases where a government agency similar to this 11 12 organization was considered to be adequate to 13 represent the agencies, to represent the oil 14 companies? 15 MR. KRETZMANN: What do you mean? 16 THE COURT: Well, you are suggesting that 17 this governmental agency, who indicated in their 18 record why it is that they made the governmental 19 decision that they did. 20 Do you have any other examples where other 21 similar governmental organizations were determined to 22 be so captured by the private industry that the 23 representation -- the governmental agency would --24 and its behaviors -- would be satisfactory to protect 25 the civil rights of the private industries?

MR. KRETZMANN: I can point to Arakaki, which the state government was representing the state's interest, but there was a would-be intervenor who went through the private pecuniary interests, and the court determined there that it did not meet the burden of showing, or making a very compelling showing, the state did not adequately represent this. THE COURT: Okay. So do you have any other

organizations where -- I can't think of another organization right off the top, but where your position is being supported that a governmental agency made a decision, gave the reasons that it is because of those reasons, therefore, the agency -- the area that they are responsible to oversee no longer has standing?

Do you have anything like that?

MR. KRETZMANN: Not on all fours with that,
your Honor, but I think this is a fairly unique
situation where we have an agency that the purpose of
these regulations was to protect the oil industry,
and they made that clear from their reasons that they
gave as justification. They made that clear from

THE COURT: So, let's see. I don't know much about this board. Was it selected by the

their opposition brief.

1 governor? 2 MR. KRETZMANN: The Division of Oil and Gas 3 and Geothermal Resources, I believe it's appointed by 4 the governor and within the executive branch. 5 THE COURT: And it's under what portion of 6 the executive branch? 7 MR. KRETZMANN: It's housed within the 8 Department of Conservation. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So it's the Department 10 of Conservation, and they have this subgroup, which 11 is this group, and the people there are appointed by 12 the governor --13 MR. KRETZMANN: Yes. 14 THE COURT: -- I would imagine. And there 15 is some sort of review. 16 And you are suggesting that that 17 organization is sufficient to represent, in this 18 proceeding, the potential intervenors. 19 MR. KRETZMANN: Yes, your Honor. 20 The Simpson Redwood Company points out that 21 when you are looking at intervention, you do a case 22 by case and look at the facts at issue. 23 So in this case it's clear that we are just 24 talking about those wells that DOGGR refuses to 25 address and allows to continue.

THE COURT: Okay. You may continue.

2.2

MR. KRETZMANN: In their briefs, the oil companies point to -- attempt to make a distinction between their interests and the interests of DOGGR, as the case has made clear, when you look at the ultimate objective of the parties, and it's clear that those are perfectly aligned here.

Anything having to do with differences in strategy and litigation tactics, that's not enough to rise to the level to rebut that presumption of adequate representation.

Industry groups make similar claims that their interests would somehow diverge from DOGGR's.

I'll address those here briefly.

The 23 wells that were shut down by DOGGR, I don't think is proof that their interests would diverge in this case.

We are talking about the ones that they refuse to address, the ones that are continuing in this day and age, are going to allow to continue for another --

THE COURT: Let's say that this court were to grant your request and tell DOGGR that they have to change their behavior. Do you think the oil companies would sue them?

MR. KRETZMANN: I can't make a prediction, your Honor. I think that --

2.4

THE COURT: Well, I think they would because I'm trying to determine on a case-by-case basis whether indeed they are of the same representation or whether they have divergent interests.

It seems to me that -- I'm having a difficult time, and that's probably where my questions are -- define whether there's an identity of interest between DOGGR and these industries.

But the court struggles with this in another context. For example, if you are dealing in depositions and determining whether or not you have -- you didn't appear at the deposition, but you nevertheless -- they wanted all the information in the deposition against your client, then there has to be a determination whether or not there was a sufficient identity of the people that were at the deposition, or the people who wanted to determine whether or not they had an opportunity to ask the questions.

I mean, those are the types of issues of identity that the court struggles with, and I have that struggle here to determine whether or not DOGGR

would do a good job or even care about the interests of the individual intervenors in this case, whether they would do what they are required to do under the charter, which is do the government things that they are responsible to do. That's the problem that I have with that.

2.3

MR. KRETZMANN: Yeah, I think it's very apparent in this case of what their interest are. Not only are they bending over backwards for the industry by openly allowing violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act to continue, but they are actively violating the law for a very narrow interest that the oil industry is.

You can't make the argument that allowing illegal injection that continues to contaminate our state's groundwater resources is somehow in the public's interest.

THE COURT: Right. Anything more?

MR. KRETZMANN: Furthermore, your Honor,

DOGGR also has a statutory duty under 3106(b), which

states that they must permit owners or operators of
the wells to utilize all methods and practices known
to the oil industry for the purpose of increasing the
ultimate recovery of underground hydrocarbons.

So they have a statutory duty to protect

1 those interests, and that puts it increasing --2 THE COURT: Can DOGGR take a position 3 against the intervenors? 4 MR. KRETZMANN: Can they? 5 THE COURT: Can they? 6 It's pretty clear from this MR. KRETZMANN: 7 case that they would not. 8 I didn't ask that THE COURT: No. 9 question. You see, because I'm determining what 10 rights and relationships, not what they -- I can't 11 predict their future, but I have to determine whether 12 or not DOGGR could tell -- could force, could reduce 13 the rights of these potential intervenors. That's why I asked the question whether or 14 15 not they could be sued or would be sued as a result 16 of you winning. 17 And I think the answer to both of those is 18 rhetorical because the answer is that indeed if what 19 is forced upon DOGGR affects the proprietary or 20 property interests of these intervenors, they would 21 have probably an obligation or right to sue them for 22 doing something improper. 2.3 Or I think that DOGGR could make a decision 24 that they, in order to carry out their mission, they 25 would have to sue or punish these intervenors, they

would do that too. And I think that as the public agency, they would be required to do that.

MR. KRETZMANN: It's possible that in the future that might arise, your Honor. But I think for the purposes of this intervention motion, we should be looking at the interests of -- with respect to the claims before the court.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. KRETZMANN: I'll add, too, that there is a separate administrative appeal process for any permits that are challenged. So there is a different forum for that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KRETZMANN: Finally, your Honor, the prerequisites considering any of the factors for mandatory intervention is timeliness. The oil industry had every opportunity to file its motion and keep our preliminary hearing on track, and they waited for three weeks in order to do that now.

Now, timeliness is all about context. And so what's reasonable delay in some cases would not be reasonable in others.

Here, we are talking about more and more contamination occurring every day, and for that reason, they failed to meet that requirement as well.

Now, failing to meet any of those four requirements is ample grounds to reject mandatory intervention, and they haven't met a single one of those.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.4

MR. KRETZMANN: In terms of permissible intervention, they also alleged that they should be allowed to intervene by discretion of the court. Here again, the factors under permissive intervention weigh heavily in favor of denying the intervention.

First, the direct and immediate interest, we discussed that already. It should not have an interest, direct, immediate or otherwise, in what's acknowledged to be violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act.

Second, the court looks at whether or not they would enlarge the issues in the case. And from their motions to intervene, I think it's pretty clear that they are attempting to introduce a lot of complexity and unnecessary extraneous issues into what is really a very straightforward case.

So for example, they mention that -
They talk about the contamination that may or may not have been found in nearby water supply wells.

Now, that is completely irrelevant to the provisions that we are talking about here. We are talking about direct injections into protected sources of drinking water.

That's what's prohibited by the Safe
Drinking Water Act period. Now whether that
contamination overtime ends up in a nearby water
supply well, in a different aquifer is a separate
question and it is not before the court today.

The attempts to bring that into this case, is a transparent attempt to add undue complexity.

And there are several examples of that, your Honor.

Thirdly, under permissive intervention, they have to show that the reasons for intervention would outweigh the interests of the parties.

Now, here we are talking about the narrow, private interests of the oil companies versus public interests, which under Sonoma v Rex, public interests generally outweighs the interest of private interests, the private parties.

The industry interests here, again, per se, illegal, versus public's interests in protecting our state's groundwater supplies.

The relative weight of those interests, your Honor, could not be farther apart. And for that

reason, the third requirement or factor in the permissive intervention also weighs in favor of denying intervention.

And finally, had the proper procedures been followed, I'll just add here that the industry groups failed to attach their complaint in intervention. We didn't get that until after our opposition was filed. I think that's pretty prejudicial. Other cases have found the failure to attach a complaint as ample grounds to deny intervention, and should be ample grounds here.

So, your Honor, in conclusion, the oil industry has not met their burden, either under mandatory or permissive intervention here, and for those reasons you should deny.

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

Moving parties?

MR. WICKERSHAM: Your Honor, I just have a few quick points.

First, the interest of the energy companies in this litigation is pretty clear.

We have submitted declarations from each of the companies. I'll just read briefly from one of them, which has language similar to --

THE COURT: You need not. I read them.

MR. WICKERSHAM: Okay. Then, your Honor, I will move on.

2.3

On the point that DOGGR is an adequate representative, it should be probably apparent, but being that they argue in the first part that DOGGR has acknowledged that energy companies have no interest in this case, and then they argue that DOGGR was representing the energy companies at some point when they made those statements, since we do not agree that we do not have any interest in these injection activities, it's pretty clear that DOGGR was not acting as our representative.

Even taking accurate view of what the evidence is that they are going to rely on in this case, you cannot argue that DOGGR is acting as a representative when it is intending to preserve its jurisdiction and is not at the same stake in the underlying activities as the energy companies do.

And for that point, I would like to briefly look at -- well, direct you to the People ex rel.

Rominger case to talk about the fact that we should not be prohibited from being in litigation to determine the interest of the oil industry.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else?

MR. GREEN: Just briefly, your Honor.

First, about DOGGR fighting tooth and nail and having the opposition of preliminary injunction that represents industry group interests, your Honor, when you review the DOGGR opposition, what you will see is that when it talks about the balancing of harm and reasons why an injunction should not be granted because you have to weigh the harm to public, it does look at the harm to the public. It doesn't actually talk about the harm to industry and oil production. It's critical that the oil industry had an opportunity to discuss that harm.

Second point out of the three is the Arakaki case. The Arakaki case talks about a presumption of adequate representation when an agency has its constituency, as the proposed intervenor as its constituency.

In the Arakaki case, it was the State of Hawaii, there was a constitutional provision that required the state to direct certain benefits to native Hawaiians. And it was a group of native Hawaiians that was seeking to intervene.

In that case, there was another group of native Hawaiians who had already been permitted to intervene.

And the court said, Well, since you are

1 already represented by the state because the state 2 has your constituency by constitution, and you have 3 already got another group in here, you don't need to 4 be part of it. 5 The third point is the concept that said 6 there's perfect alignment between industry groups and 7 DOGGR. And your Honor has already discussed that 8 issue extensively with counsel for the plaintiffs. 9 But one of the other things that plaintiffs 10 ignore is that the industry groups aren't in this 11 litigation to defend the emergency regulations, the 12 points that we made in our papers. We are here to 13 defend against the shut in by preliminary injunction 14 of these injection wells. 15 Thank you. 16 Thank you very much, THE COURT: 17 Counselors. I reviewed my notes and you'll get my 18 decision by Wednesday. 19 That will do it. Thank you, Counsel. MR. KRETZMANN: If I might add one more 20 21 thing. 22 No, because he gets the last THE COURT: 23 Moving party gets the last word. word. 24 (Proceedings concluded at 4:43 p.m.) 25 --000--

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	I, KATHRYN LLOYD, CSR No. 5955, Certified
3	Shorthand Reporter, certify:
4	That the foregoing proceedings were taken before
5	me at the time and place therein set forth;
6	That the statements of the parties made at the
7	time of the proceedings were recorded
8	stenographically by me and were thereafter
9	transcribed;
10	That the foregoing is a true and correct
11	transcript of my shorthand notes so taken.
12	I further certify that I am not a relative or
13	employee of any attorney of the parties, nor
14	financially interested in the action.
15	I declare under penalty of perjury under the
16	laws of California that the foregoing is true and
17	correct.
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Docket No. RG15769302

1	Docket No. KO13/09302						
1	PROOF OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION						
2	I, Lilia H. Jackson, the undersigned, hereby declare as follows:						
3	1. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within cause. I am						
4	employed by Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP in the City of San Francisco, California.						
5	2. My email and business addresses are lilia.jackson@pillsburylaw.com; Four						
6	Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor, San Francisco, CA 94111-5998. My mailing address is						
7	Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor, San Francisco, CA 94126-2824.						
8	3. On June 19, 2015, at Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor, San Francisco,						
9	CA 94111-5998, I served a true copy of the attached document titled exactly						
10	INDUSTRY GROUPS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF						
11	TRANSCRIPT OF COURT HEARING IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION						
12							
13	by sending it via electronic transmission to the following persons at the electronic-mail						
14	addresses so indicated:						
16 17 18	William B. Rostov, Esq. Tamara T. Zakim, Esq. John Wall, Esq. Earthjustice 50 California Street, Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94111 wrostov@earthjustice.org tzakim@earthjustice.org jwall@earthjustice.org jwall@earthjustice.org Jeffrey D. Dintzer, Esq. Matthew C. Wickersham, Esq. Sibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071 jdintzer@gibsondunn.com mwickersham@gibsondunn.com njohnson@gibsondunn.com						
20 21 22 23	Baine P. Kerr, Esq. California Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1700 Los Angeles, CA 90013 baine.kerr@doj.ca.gov Hollin Kretzmann, Esq. Center for Biological Diveristy 1212 Broadway, Street #800 Oakland, CA 94612 hkretzmann@biologicaldiversity.org						
24	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this						
25	19th day of June, 2015, at San Francisco, California.						
26							
27	·						
28	Lilia H. Jackson						